Table of ContentsEthnic IdentityTerritorySolutionsCase Study: RwandaConclusionBibliographyWars have distinct modes of eruption and escalation. In many cases, wars are planned and expected, while in other cases they seem rather sudden and unexpected. Before the 1990s, the world saw more wars based on ideological positions than ethnic conflicts. However, since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed more wars based on ethnic identity or affiliation and belonging. While wars over ideological differences may be easier to resolve, wars based on identity or ethnic civil wars are considered entrenched and extremely difficult to pacify. Simply put, ideologies are subject to change and each group can be accommodated and appeased. However, in ethnic civil wars, this is not the case. Such conflicts therefore often become unpredictable and very difficult to resolve. Therefore, the international community has not yet been fully able to find adequate ways to resolve these ethnic conflicts. Ethnic civil wars are of a very particular nature. The reasons for their outbreak, the conduct of the war and their possibility of resolution have very different dynamics from those of traditional wars. Taking the Rwandan genocide as a case study, it is evident that such a war, although yet another war, can be very different from cross-border wars. The peculiar nature of ethnic civil wars is very intriguing. This begs the question: what is the nature of ethnic civil wars and what are the possible solutions to resolve the problem? How did Rwanda “solve” its ethnic problems and how effective was this solution? Ethnic civil wars are different in nature and more difficult to resolve than traditional wars because ethnicities cannot be changed and are often linked to personal identity. Furthermore, the conflict concerns an already shared piece of land for which all parties involved are arguing. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get an original essay The many entanglements of ethnic civil wars make them very interesting to study. In this article, I will first discuss, from a theoretical perspective, the nature of civil wars, why and how they occur, and the factors that make them exceptionally difficult conflicts to resolve. Additionally, I will discuss the literature found on possible solutions for resolving ethnic conflicts. To apply the theory to a real-world example, I will use Rwanda as a case study and discuss the outbreak of the conflict and how the ethnic war in Rwanda was resolved. Finally, I will assess the effectiveness of the Rwandan solution to the conflict. Ethnic Identity Ethnic civil wars present one of the most difficult conflicts to resolve due to the deeply rooted identity of each side. While in traditional wars people may rally from one side to the other and are often likely to switch sides, in ethnic wars people fight for their identity and who they are. Researchers define ethnicity as “inherent characteristics of individuals or groups that are not subject to change and can be the direct cause of conflict.” Specialists in new wars affirm that societies marked byEthnic divides are more prone to ethnic civil wars which can break out at any time due to “old hatreds” between ethnic groups. Kaufmann argues in his article on ethnic civil wars that individuals' loyalties are "quite rigid" in ethnic civil wars and that those involved can never change sides. He further asserts that war deepens and hardens ethnic identities (Kaufmann, 1996). This intensifies the likelihood of widespread violence and lengthens the duration of the war itself. The reason ethnic wars escalate rapidly is because locals know which people belong to which ethnic groups, where they live, and how they dress and speak. The settlement of mixed populations can intensify violence and motivate ethnic cleansing. Therefore, it becomes easier to create attacks and fuel more aggression in the face of hatred. Since such wars are based on identity, it is difficult to mobilize more people than those who actually belong to that ethnicity. However, group mobilization is easy because it is the entire ethnic group that is at stake in ethnic cleansing or land conquest. And even those who place little value on their ethnic identity face pressure for ethnic mobilization (Kaufmann, 1996). Often, the pressures can be punishing and impose sanctions on those who do not contribute to the war with their ethnic group. For each ethnic group, the use of violence against the other is justifiable because there is always the fear of ethnic cleansing. And so the idea is that the group that clears the other first wins. The atrocities of war make any political apprehension or negotiation impossible. Therefore, ethnic identities make ethnic cooperation largely inaccessible. Territory Another factor that makes ethnic conflicts exceptional is that war is fought to consolidate power over a certain piece of land. The struggle for territory itself creates a security dilemma, in which the absence of security during wartime pushes ethnic groups to be more violent towards each other, thereby increasing the threats of insecurity for each of them. However, for most ethnic groups, they would forgo immediate security for delayed gratification of territorial acquisition. Territorial acquisition is not only a sign of victory, but also a security of identity as well as a symbol of physical survival. “For ethnic groups, territory is invariably linked to group identity.” The “homeland” therefore presents a vital aspect for the security of the group and there is always a fear of the “other” who shares the same house. However, the collision occurs when both groups realize that to ensure their survival, they must acquire the same land. For this reason, violence is often always extreme because both groups claim land ownership and their right to protect it. In ethnic wars, mobilization is easy because the goal is not an abstract idea, it is about claiming control of a territory where people live. already living and belonging. Thus, in order to ensure its own survival, an ethnic group will attempt to control the territories in which it is geographically concentrated. However, violence can be exacerbated in societies where populations are mixed due to offensive opportunities. The proximity between enemies can lead both groups to always be offensive in order to deter the other side (Weidmann, 2009). Therefore, mixed societies may face more severe atrocities during ethnic conflictsand proximity could increase the risks of ethnic cleansing. As Weidmann noted, fragmented ethnic groups are often less likely to be as violent as clustered groups. However, the start of the war changed the geographical distribution of ethnic groups. Those who can afford to move will move closer to a group from their ethnic group because it represents more security. This notion further explains why ethnic wars become more and more violent the longer they last. The more ethnic groups are able to be geographically concentrated, the more offensive they are able to be (Melander, 2009). Therefore, ethnic conflicts become extremely difficult to resolve due to the geographical proximity of enemies and the refusal of both sides to cooperate. Solutions While ethnic civil wars present a very complicated situation, many researchers have attempted to propose solutions to prevent conflict or ethnic cleansing. In many cases the proposed solutions seem rather simplistic, while in others they seem possible. Although in many cases the conflict seems rather insoluble, some solutions are nevertheless considered viable. The literature found suggests that there are many ways to end ethnic conflicts. The most simplistic is to negotiate settlements. This solution, although very noble, seems rather unviable when each group is committed to eliminating the other. Negotiation as a solution can be beneficial at the beginning of the conflict before it develops into a full-fledged war. Weiberg-Salzmann further argues that groups involved in ethnic conflict are less likely to allow peace negotiations because the demilitarization that follows negotiations presents a threat to each respective group. Kaufmann proposed in his article that if peaceful negotiations do not work at the local level, peace enforcement could be enforced by a third party; suggested the UN. Kaufmann argued that suppressing the conflict could be accomplished through sanctions, military aid, or direct military intervention (Kaufmann, 1996). Other researchers suggest that a better possible solution would be partition. Researchers in favor of partition say it reduces the risk of remilitarization and ensures a more stable security situation for both sides. Kaufmann, in his article, supports the demographic separation of ethnic groups because it “reduces both incentives and opportunities to continue the fight.” Although demographic separation rightly diminishes the possibility of future wars, it seems a little too utopian. When it comes to a real application, this solution faces some difficulties. First, this solution favors the breakup of states. Additionally, in societies where populations are mixed, group transfer can be difficult and result in many casualties. Plus, not everyone would want to move. Those who are strongly attached to where they live may be reluctant to move. Furthermore, conflict could resume over which group will take which part of the territory and where the borders should be drawn. Therefore, this solution, although very promising for reducing conflicts, can prove difficult in practice. Another solution to end the struggle for power in ethnic civil wars could be power sharing. Power sharing, researchers say, is an attractive solution when partition is not optional. For power sharing to work, as Kaufmann stated, there must be a joint exercise of powergovernment, a proportional distribution of government funds and substantial autonomy on ethnic issues as well as a veto on minority power. Essentially, for power sharing to work, both sides must actively choose to cooperate and commit to avoiding ethnic conflict. Likewise, other scholars have agreed that power sharing is a feasible solution that benefits all parties involved. “Power-sharing institutions foster a sense of security among former enemies and encourage conditions conducive to self-imposed peace.” Hartzell and Hoddie added that power sharing promotes positive political interactions. Essentially, power sharing limits the chances of one group monopolizing power and dominating the other. Case Study: Rwanda Rwanda represents a crucial case study when studying ethnic civil wars. With excessive conflict and rising hatred between Tutsis and Hutus, we can begin to understand the complexity of ethnic civil wars. The rich Tutsis, a minority, long took power over the Rwandan kingdom. In 1933, the Belgians took over Rwanda, introduced ethnic identity cards, and ensured that most jobs and education went to Tutsis (Kuhlman, 2016). In 1959, there was a Hutu revolution which ousted the Belgians and the monarchy. In 1962, Rwanda gained independence from Belgium and the Hutus came to power. They began killing Tutsis, forcing hundreds of thousands to leave the country. In 1990, Tutsi refugees in Uganda formed an armed rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, and returned to Rwanda to wage war against the Hutu army. Efforts were made by organizations and states to bring peace to Rwanda by proposing the Arusha Accords. The agreement called for a ceasefire, disarmament and an interim power-sharing transitional government. Peace efforts seemed somewhat promising until April 1994, when Rwandan President Habyarimana's plane was shot down by Tutsi rebels. Since this incident, a hundred days of genocide had begun. In just one hundred days, an estimated 800,000 to 100,000 people were killed and the international community was unable to stop the genocide. The killing was so brutal that “the world’s largest peacekeeping force was unable to stop the fighting (“Genocide in Rwanda,” 2014). The war ended when the Rwandan Patriotic Front captured the territory and the government collapsed. Peace talks had stopped during the genocide and the mission was to bring both sides back to the negotiating table to conclude the peace agreement previously signed in 1993. In September 1994, a power-sharing government was formed. After seizing power in Rwanda, the RPF installed an “extended transitional government,” allegedly in line with the Arusha Accords. The new transitional government, however, has made the extremist Hutu party illegal and is therefore not part of the power-sharing agreement. However, the new government included other parties, but these were politically weak. The power-sharing government worked with equal representation until 2003, where the RPF won 40 seats in the elections. This event puts the case of Rwanda to the test; Was the Rwandan case a failure? For many reasons, the Arusha peace agreements did not bear the hoped-for results. To begin, the agreement called for disarmament and a ceasefire, but many people refused to disarm out of fear of possible future conflict. In addition to equal representation which ended in/20684601