In a campaign called the Tet Offensive, Viet Cong forces, led by General Vo Nguyen Giap, would turn the tide of the war and impose a relentless attack on the South. Vietnamese. The primary goals of North Vietnamese forces in launching the Tet Offensive were to dissipate ARVN forces and simultaneously spark or catalyze discontent that would lead to an uprising against the South Vietnamese government. The second objective was to destroy confidence and support for American involvement in the war. While the first objective was fully achieved, the second was not. The attacks did not necessarily trigger or dissipate the ARVN to lead to an uprising, in fact the Viet Cong forces were spread thin enough that the American and South Vietnamese armies could counter and inflict casualties accordingly. However, when the Tet Offensive was reported in the American media, American public opinion began to change. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why violent video games should not be banned”? Get an original essay “This bloodshed and devastation caused by the violent fighting, as well as the pessimistic reports, which were transmitted directly into the American salons, stunned everyone. American who watched it” (Rohn). Along with the realization that Americans were facing serious losses, the media, which had initially supported the war, also turned against supporting the war. Additionally, the anti-war protest movement reached its peak in early 1968 after the Tet Offensive, which started the war. the most intense anti-war demonstration to date. A Gallup poll showed that in 1968, 46 percent of people thought sending American troops to Vietnam was a mistake, up from 32 percent in 1967, illustrating the dramatic increase in anti-war sentiment. One particular volume of the Pentagon Papers suggests the importance of public opinion in decisions regarding escalation during the Tet Offensive: With the Tet Offensive, General Westmoreland asked Johnson to send him 200,000 additional troops in more than the 525,000 already there. Johnson consulted a small group of “action agents” on the matter. The report states that "it will be difficult to convince critics that we are not simply destroying South Vietnam in order to 'save' it and that we genuinely want peace talks." This growing disaffection, accompanied, as it certainly will be, by increased distrust of conscription and growing unrest in the cities because of the belief that we are neglecting domestic problems, presents great risks of cause an internal crisis of unprecedented proportions.” This is a secret report written by political and military experts and is therefore unlikely to have an underlying agenda. Furthermore, the idea that escalation would cause significant unrest is valid; The Tet Offensive led the public to question the accuracy of the US government's claim that it would soon prevail over the Communists, with much of the public having previously held a view war optimist. The offensive marked a critical turning point for the war, as Johnson effectively refused Westmoreland's troops and announced on March 31 that he was "taking the first step to deescalate the conflict." Three days later, Hanoi announced that it was ready to discuss with the Americans and discussions began in Paris on May 13. Even if these talks did not succeed.