Eight decades have passed since the outbreak of the Great Depression, but the enduring mystery of its cause continues to provoke academic debate among researchers of various fields. Eichengreen and Temin share the debates by linking the ideology of reference to the cause of the Great Depression. They believe that because of this ideology, monetary and fiscal authorities implemented deflationary policies when hindsight clearly shows that expansionary policies were necessary. And these contractionary policies pushed the struggling global economy into the Great Depression. Eichengreen and Temin put great emphasis on analyzing why the pre-war gold standard could be a force for international financial stability while the inter-war gold standard was the force that has led the world to economic catastrophe. Their convincing arguments constitute an important contribution to the understanding of the cause. However, by examining the details of their explanation, flaws can also be discovered. My analysis of Eichengreen and Temin's argument is divided into three parts. In Part 1, I elaborate on their explanation of the cause of the Great Depression and why the interwar gold standard failed while its predecessor succeeded. In the second part, I highlight two aspects of the strengths of their explanation. And in the last part, the weaknesses of their studies will be examined. The Cause Eichengreen and Temin attribute the cause of the Great Depression to the mentality of central bankers and political leaders that reestablishing the pre-World War I gold standard was essential to reestablishing a healthy international order. and economic prosperity. They admit that the initial economic decline could begin from the Wall Street Crash of 1929 in the United States...... middle of paper ...... the credibility of individual national commitments to gold and issues Controversial German reparations and war debts increased distrust between countries, making international cooperation unlikely. Without credibility and cooperation, the gold standard is not viable. Eichengreen and Temin successfully demonstrate that the success of the prewar gold standard was due to international cooperation rather than the existence of a hegemonic stabilizer. And they also used compelling evidence to show that the gold standard could not be a source of stability in the interwar period. However, their explanation has details. First, they did not explain the various domestic policies related to the break with the gold standard. Second, they also exaggerated the influence of the gold standard mentality and its power to change economic history through a small group of elites..