Both Plato and Aristotle reject the moral relativism of the Sophists and address the question of how man can achieve absolute virtue. In The Republic, Plato constructs a proof of existence, a kallipolis that produces philosopher kings who grasp the eternal Good and rule benevolently. Aristotle discusses the kallipolis at length in The Politics, but much of his criticism concerns its implementation. Yet Aristotle at least makes one valid criticism of the theory, accusing Plato of inappropriately abusing holism in assessing the happiness of the state. But Aristotle also fails to resolve the underlying problem of ensuring the complete happiness of all individuals; he ultimately constructs a political theory fundamentally similar to that of Plato.Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”?Get Original EssayPlato posits a tripartite soul with appetitive, spirited, and rational parts, corresponding to the producers, gatekeepers, and rulers of the kallipolis (The Republic 435c-441c). Such a construction poses an apparent internal inconsistency. The guardian class, for example, may represent only the spiritual part, but individual guardians always possess all three parts of the soul. The inconsistency disappears if the kallipolis serves only as a macrocosm of the soul, since a soul part has only that soul part. But a kallipolis qua polis must resolve the question of how a lively class can be composed of members who also possess desires and rationality. Plato defends his conception of the three classes by appealing to the idea of ​​specialization of labor. He asks: “Does a person do a better job if he practices many professions or, since he is one person himself, if he practices one? (370b). He adopts this economic principle for his kallipolis, assigning to each inhabitant the function for which he is most naturally suited (423d). In other words, Plato asserts that producers should accept work and pursue their physical desires without the need for significant mental edification, while more rational souls should live ascetic lives. In this context, it makes sense that Plato would deny guardians money, goods, and even travel (419). For Guardians to achieve the maximum bravery and glory required by their spirited souls, they must specialize and avoid distractions. But the idea of ​​work specialization implies that certain activities are practiced at the expense of others. If Plato selects and cultivates the part of the soul that will bring maximum benefit to the kallipolis, Adeimantus can assert that Plato practices the relative suppression of the other two parts, if they exist. Guardians, for example, must be weaned from appetitive desires (419). Adeimantus fears that such inhibition will cause misfortune. After all, Plato discourages guardians from enjoying ordinary pleasures like property (416-17). Adeimantus essentially points out that human nature, as defined by Plato himself, contains innate needs for things. It challenges Plato's implicit assumption that an appropriate environment, expressed through societal laws, can overcome such innate inclinations and modify these desires toward better and higher goals. If Plato were to characterize the kallipolis as theoretical and not subject to pragmatic concerns, the question of how tripartite souls give rise to city segments behaving according to a single soul part thatwould disappear. Guardians, under the influence of the law, would abandon their physical desires, a change that would allow them to achieve the greatest degree of happiness possible. But Plato expresses his own practical concerns when he says: "We would say that it would not be surprising if these people were happiest as they are, but that in establishing our city we are not seeking to create a any group. extraordinarily happy, but to make the whole city thus, as much as possible” (420b). Plato concedes that the guardians sacrifice at least part of their happiness, since they are happier in their original condition outside the kallipolis. He admits that the appetitive component of the soul cannot be suppressed without impacting happiness. But his reference to the happiness of “the whole city” seems vague. Plato means either that some holistic happiness exists even if no part of the city is happy, or that the diminished happiness of the guards increases the happiness of other classes and thus raises the happiness of the entire city. Here, Aristotle launches his major theoretical assault by interpreting Plato's falsely postulated holistic happiness. Aristotle responds: “Again, although he denies happiness even to the Guardians, he maintains that it is the duty of a legislator to make the entire city happy. But it is impossible for the whole to be happy unless the majority, if not really all, or at least some of the parts, possess happiness. Because happiness is a very different thing from equality: two odd numbers added together give an even number, but two unhappy sections cannot give a happy state, unless the Guardians are happy. happy, who will be? Certainly not the skilled workers and the rest of the mechanics” (La Politique 1264b15). Aristotle makes two points here, which can be independently verified as to the fairness of the treatment compared to what Plato says. His first point argues that since happiness is an intrinsic quality, lumping together different souls of varying discontent cannot produce happiness. This point seems reasonable, but it only partially contradicts what Plato claims. Perhaps Aristotle was responding negatively to Plato by making the following analogy: Suppose then that someone came up to us while we were painting a statue and objected, because we painted the eyes (which are the most beautiful part) in black rather than black. purple, we had not applied the most beautiful colors to the most beautiful parts of the statue. We think it is reasonable to offer the following defense: "You should not expect us to paint the eyes so prettily that they no longer appear to be eyes at all, and the same goes for the other parts. Rather, you must look to see. if by treating each part appropriately we make the whole statue beautiful. (420c-d)Aristotle has a valid criticism of Plato in that the latter means that the happiness of a city can be closely compared to the beauty of a statue. To be beautiful, the statue must be appreciated by the eye of the beholder. Violet eyes would spoil the effect; looking at the statue holistically makes sense. But the happiness of cities must be judged according to different criteria than those applied in art galleries. While beauty may be an external state to be seen, happiness is an internal state to be experienced. As Aristotle suggests, happiness cannot be compared to regularity, which can result from odd numbers. Rather, the happiness of the city is equal to the sum of the happiness of its parts. Plato, however, argues that having one part of the population too happy would ruin the happiness of other parts. Aristotle, perhaps addressing this other ideaplatonist, makes the second point: if the keepers are not happy, then the producers cannot be either. His assertion seems tangential and unsupported. In any case, he misses the real Platonic argument: "You must not force us to give our guardians the kind of happiness that would make them anything other than guardians... surely you see that they will completely destroy the city, just because they alone have the possibility of governing it well and making it happy” (420d-1a). Implicitly, Plato argues that guardians who regularly engage in appetitive goals would no longer be guardians, but among the common producers. He has a strict sense of what a tutor can do acceptably and still be effective. Furthermore, Plato states that it is not so much a question of whether the other classes will be happy if the guardians are not perfectly happy, as Aristotle claims, but whether the city can exist if normal pleasures corrupt the guards. Plato seems to envision an extremely slippery slope, with guardians like shepherds and normal people like sheep. If the shepherds lowered their vigilance and enjoyed materialistic pleasures, the sheep would certainly be captured by the wolves of anarchy. Aristotle does not directly refute Plato as to whether such complete deterioration would occur. But in upholding the kallipolis against objections about happiness, Plato takes the rather rigid position that even small deviances would destroy the city, and therefore less than complete happiness should be tolerated, since a stable city is happier than chaos total. Thus, the result appears that the happiest city cannot contain as happy individuals as possible. Although Aristotle does not treat Plato fairly, his critique emphasizes that individual souls cannot enjoy a mysterious holistic happiness. Without this condition, Plato must resort to his argument that he sacrifices some individual happiness for utilitarian reasons of preserving the state. Aristotle recognizes that unhappiness results from the suppression of certain parts of the soul. He criticizes practices such as the sharing of wives among guardians because it opposes pleasure to the same degree (1262a32). He does not see the Platonic slippery slope. But Aristotle, in the same breath, argues that a community of wives and children may be suitable for the agricultural class (1262a40). He claims that if producers have less affection, they will be more likely to obey their leaders. Aristotle uses the same logic here as Plato: he sacrifices lower forms of flourishing to the interests of stability. In other words, he gives more importance to the absence of revolt than to individual happiness.=2E Aristotle ultimately rejects the communal sharing of wives and children to include it in his political theory; he observes that property and pleasure strengthen the interpersonal ties that bind the state (1262b3). Unlike Plato, he believes that a state of maximum stability and goodness can be achieved with less extreme measures. In addition to accepting a role for citizens' appetitive desires, Aristotle gives them more room to realize their highest faculty, reason = 2E. He recognizes that the virtues of a good citizen and a good man are not the same, because the former possesses only correct opinions and obedience, while the latter possesses practical wisdom (1277b16). Aristotle emphasizes the role of rule, or the employment of practical wisdom, for human virtue and he extends this capacity widely for certain constitutions, particularly in the political system. Plato, on the other hand, considers the rule as a necessity and not as.