Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik examine the relationship between cash flows and a fund's management ability, management incentives, and management flexibility. They find that money flows chase returns and are significantly higher (lower) for funds that are consistent winners (losers). This is consistent with funds with greater management capacity, i.e. better and consistent performance in the past, attracting higher flows. Scholz and Wilkens (2003) argue that performance measurement depends on the investor's concrete decision-making situation. This means that a different performance measure is appropriate for an investor who invests all his risky assets in a single investment fund than for an investor who spreads his risky assets, for example in a stock index and an investment fund. According to Agarwal, Daniel and Naik, they demonstrate that funds with greater management incentives experience more flows, suggesting that investors reward funds where there is better alignment of interests between the manager and investors. According to Jensen (1968) and Treynor (1965), a performance measure which also takes into account the correlation between the market index and the respective investment fund is adequate. Choosing an appropriate performance measure depends on how an investment fund's returns are distributed. In the case of normal distribution