Kant, Velleman and Thomson put together a series of arguments on whether or not it is morally right to offer terminally ill patients the option of being assisted to die by their doctors or caregivers and how. From Kant's perspective, morality concerns the relationship between motivations and action. This knowledge of morality comes from reasoning about what a law for human action could be. According to Kant, actions are performed for a reason, and reasons, in turn, are general and apply to all rational creatures. But reasons do not require us, they only command us. A commandment or imperative suggests what we must do, but it is also something we may not do. Kant sees this as the gap between recognizing that something is right and actually doing it. Kant states that he is an autonomist and that “autonomy is […] the foundation of human nature and of all rational nature.” (Kant, 4:436). Even though Thomson and Velleman agree that the autonomy of the people should be treated with respect, they both interpret this as leading to conclusions that not only differ from Kant's view, but also have very different consequences from each other . On the one hand, Velleman argues that respect for people's autonomy does not require us to make euthanasia a protected option, even if it is formally provided for and over which the patient has exclusive authority. On the other side of the debate, Thomson says that respecting people's autonomy requires us to do so. After briefly outlining each argument, I will defend Thomson's argument by objecting that Velleman's view of giving the patient the right to die does not give the patient a new option, but merely restores a lost option for him by the state of his health. condition.Kant's argument...... middle of article ......following this logic, one could extend this to suggest that by giving an incapacitated patient the right to die, we do not Let's not give him a new option whatsoever. In these circumstances, it seems logical that we would restore a previously held right to an option lost by the state of their condition. After all, if Velleman really sticks to his own logic that “our ability to justify our choices to the people around us is what allows us to maintain the role of rational agent in our relationships with them; and it is therefore essential for us to remain, in their eyes, an eligible partner in cooperation and conversation, or an object of proper respect” (Velleman, p. 11), that as a rational agent he must follow its own logic as we did. set out in our objection and thus personifying why I am more inclined to side with Thomson.