David Hume, who wrote An Inquiry into Moral Principles in 1751, and Adam Smith, author of The Wealth of Nations in 1776, both spoke of an emotion or 'a particular human characteristic called sympathy. the definition of which differs greatly from the familiar meaning attributed to it today. Each mentioned the word not as a synonym for pity, sorrow, or compassion, but rather as a mutual relationship in which whatever affects one consequently affects the other. However, in the context of each philosopher's very different moral code, the term and its ethical value are different. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned"?Get the original essay Hume begins his discussion of the term with a surprisingly vague description, arguing that a "comradeship" exists among all men, and that it is demonstrated in man's inability to be alone: ​​“Reduce a person to solitude, and he loses all enjoyment, except that of the sensual or speculative nature; and this because the movements of his heart are not transmitted by the corresponding movements of his fellow men. " (Hume, 43). Not only do all non-sensual and non-speculative feelings arise in man from sympathy, but "fellowship" enables man to accept or deny moral principles. The virtues speak the more strongly to the sympathetic aspect of man; when a "like creature" demonstrates moral virtue, sympathy allows man to overcome all other emotions and consider it virtuous. through a hypothetical example: Exalted ability, unwavering courage, prosperous success these can only expose a hero or a politician to the envy or ill will of the public: but as soon as we add praise; human and beneficent; when examples of clemency, tenderness or friendship are shown: envy itself is silent or joins in the general voice of approval and applause (Hume, 17 thus argues). that the rational mind of man is not the arbiter of moral virtue; Instead, this task belongs to man's inherent sympathy and "comradeship." Hume, however, goes even further and finally states the hypothesis he seeks to prove: “morality is determined by feeling” (Hume, 85). If this hypothesis is assumed to be correct, it necessarily defines virtue as “any action or mental quality which gives to the beholder a pleasant feeling of approval” (Hume, 85). The philosopher continues by separating two contradictory terms as distinctly as possible: reason and taste. He divides them completely: Reason, being cold and disengaged, is no motive for action, and directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, showing us the means of attaining happiness or to avoid unhappiness: Taste, depending on whether it provides pleasure or pain, and thus constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive for action and is the first spring or impulse of desire and will ( Hume, 88). By so definitively isolating these two terms, Hume can assert that taste “gives the feeling of beauty and of the will.” deformity, vice, and virtue” (Hume, 88). Because of his disparate perspective, the so-called “father of modern economics,” Adam Smith, uses sympathy in a much different way. It is best to refer to his earlier work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, written in 1759, when discussing Smith's ethics, and to The Wealth of Nations only when discussing context and economics . His treatment is much less extensive than Hume's, and therefore much vaguer. Smith argues that the.).