In “Freedom of will and the conception of the person”, Harry Frankfurt illustrates the concepts of freedom of will and freedom of action, but more importantly. , Frankfurt refined the theory of compatibilism. Compatibilism allows freedom of will to exist in the deterministic world. According to the theory of determinism, the future state of the worlds is determined by certain events that occurred in the distant past (E) and by the laws of nature (L). Specifically, E refers to history, such as experiences or states, while L refers to scientific or physical laws such as gravity. For example, an alcoholic's action is determined by the fact that he will not stop drinking. Here, E means that he had drunk in the past and L is the physiological effect of dependence caused by alcohol. Since we can control neither E nor L, it follows that we can never act freely. The compatibilist thesis, however, asserts that we can have free will, even if all our actions are determined by forces beyond our control. Frankfurt compatibilism provides a more refined model than Humean compatibilism. Human compatibilism denied the deterministic notion of freedom – the ability to have chosen otherwise. Hume then offers a new definition of freedom, as “a power to act or not to act, according to the determinations of the will” (“Of Liberty and Necessity,” 23). According to Hume, as long as we act according to our desires and beliefs, we exercise freedom of will and freedom of action. Frankfurt adds a further distinction within our desires and concludes that our will is free if and only if we act according to a first-order desire determined by our second-order desire. The will of an agent, defined by Frankfurt, is “the notion of an effective desire – one which moves (or will or would move) a… middle of paper……pulled.” Brainwashing is analogous to forces beyond our control. Frankfurt's theory remains valid, since we are not interested in the origin of Sam's second-order desire. When he has free will, this implies that he is acting freely in selling his business. In fact, Frankfurt seems to weaken the theory of determinism. If some external force causally determines Sam's second-order desire, then Sam cannot have desired otherwise. That is, he cannot have two second-order versions of desire, neither of which allows him to have freedom of will or freedom of action. In other words, the Frankfurt theory leads to a completely different conclusion when Frankfurt compatibilism disagrees with determinism. Works Cited Frankfurt, Harry. “Freedom of will and notion of person”. Web. Hume, David. “Of freedom and necessity”. An investigation into human understanding. Internet.